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THE TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT*

Samuel Anatole Lourie t

THE present war, more than any previous one, is a tridimensional
total war. It is being fought in three major fields: the military, the
economic and the psychological. In all types of warfare numerous
weapons, devices and means are openly or secretly used. "Camouflage"
is not the exclusive domain of military warfare; it is more frequently
and more successfully used in economic and psychological warfare.
Economic and psychological warfare may, and usually do, precede military warfare. Imminent military conflict projects its fatal shadow on
the prewar period,.creating a status which is neither peace nor war,
neither neutrality nor belligerency, but something intermediate, not yet
determined by international law. The successful prosecution of the war
requires the maximum mobilization of all physical, economic and intellectual resources of the country. The importance of the economic
component of the so-called "war potential" is generally recognized.
The numerous measures taken, legislative and administrative, are directed, on the one hand, at augmenting the resources of the country
and adapting them to the requirements of war, and, on the other hand,
at depriving the enemy of everything which might increase his war
potential.
One of the legislative measures which is directed at both ends, the
strengthening of the economic power of this country and the weakening
of the enemy, is the regulation of trading with the enemy.
· The purpose of this paper is to discuss two aspects of the Trading
with the Enemy Act 1 of October 6, r 9 r 7: ( r) The evolution of the
T .E.A. through legislative enactments and executive orders; ( 2) Some

*

The various defintions of "enemy" within the framework of the Trading with
the Enemy Act, and some problems of international law in connection therewith, will
be discussed by the same author in the next issue of the REvrnw.
Degrees in law and economics, University of Tartu, Estonia; M.A., LL.B.,
Columbia University; formerly a member of the Estonian bar.-Ed.
1
40 Stat. L. 4II (1917), as amended, 50 U.S. C. (Supp. 1942), Appendix, §
I et seq. (hereinafter referred to as T. E. A.).

t
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problems of constitutional and administrative law raised by the last
amendment to the act.

I
EvoLUTION oF THE TRADING WITH THE ENEMY AcT

A. Legislative History
The provisions of the T.E.A. and the scope of their effectiveness
can bes~ be understood and construed against ,the background of their
legal history and the public policy which led to their enactment, and
further evolution. This can be done here only sketchily and to the extent necessary for the ensuing discussion.2
The Trading with the Enemy Act was originally enacted on October 6, 1917, six months after the entry of the United States into World
War I. At that time the other countries had been at war for three years
and .their experiences with the handling of alien enemy property was
taken into consideration. The British Trading with the Enemy Acts
was used as a model, though the American act incorporated many important differences.
·
The reasons given for the adoption of the act are briefly: ( 1) to
prevent aid and comfort to enemies; ( 2) to make available for the
financing and successful prosecution of the war such funds and property
in this country as belong to 'enemies or the allies of enemies-; and (3).
to protect interests in property rights of private persons.4
There was a certain disagreement as to the purpose of prot~ction of
2 For more details, see ADMINISTRATION OF THE OFFICE OF ALIEN PROPERTY
CusTODIAN, S. Doc. 182, 69th. Cong., 2d sess. (1926); U. S. ALIEN PROPERTY
CusTODIAN, ANNUAL REPORTS, covering the years 1917-1932, issued annually from
1918 to 1933; THIESING, TRADING WITH THE ENEMY, S. Doc. 107, 65th Cong., 1st
sess. (1917); CHARLES R. ALLISON, ALIEN ENEMIES AND PROPERTY RIGHTS (1921)
(privately printed); Borchard, "Enemy Private Property," 18 AM. J. INT. L. 523
(1924); Borchard, "Treatment of Enemy Private Property in the United States
before the ·world War," 22 id. 636 ( 1928); Borchard, "Reprisals on Private Property,"
30 id. 108 (1936); GATHINGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN TREATMENT
OF ALIEN ENEMY PROPERTY ( l 940).
8
4 and 5 Geo. 5, c. 87 (1914).
4
For statements of the purposes of the T.E.A., see United States v. Chemical
Foundation, 272 U. S. 1, 47 S. Ct. l (1926); Banco Mexicano de Comercio e
lndustria v. Deutsche Bank, 53 App. D. C. 266, 289 F. 924, (1923), a.ffd. 263 U. S.
591, 44 S. Ct. 209 (1924); Swiss Nat. Ins. Co. v. Miller, 53 App. D •. C. 173, 289
F. 571 (1923), a.ffd. 267 U.S. 42, 45 S. Ct. 213 (1925); American Exchange Nat.
Bank v. Palmer, (D. C. N. Y. 1919) 256 F. 680; U. S. ALIEN PROPERTY CUSTODIAN,
BULLETIN OF INFORMATION 5 (1918); HUBERICH, THE LAW RELATING TO TRADING
WITH THE ENEMY 46 (1918).
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the interests of the owners of private property/ and this purpose was
emphasized during the progress of the bill through Congress.6
Numerous amendments have been adopted since the passage of the
original act, three of which are here mentioned.
·
Exercising the power granted in section 5(b) of the T.E.A., President Roosevelt, on March 6, 1933, declared a national banking holiday,
placed an embargo on all gold shipments out of the United States, and
licensed the banks to be reopened after the banking holiday. On March
9, 1933, an act was passed by Congress declaring the existence of a
serious emergency, making section 5 (b) applicable, not only during
time of war but also "during any other period of national emergency
declared by the President," and approving and confirming all prior
actions taken by the President or the Secretary of the Treasury.7
By virtue of the authority vested in him by the amendment, the
President, on January 15, 1934, issued Executive Order 6:560 requiring foreign exchange transactions to be licensed by the Secretary of the
Treasury except where entered into in response to normal commercial
or business requirements and to cover reasonable travelling and other
expenses. By a general license issued on November 12, 1934 by the
Secretary of the Treasury, full freedom to trade in foreign exchange
was practically re-established.
Following the German invasion of Denmark and Norway on April
9, 1940, the President issued on April 10th Executive Order 8389 8
prohibiting certain transactions involving property in which Norway or
Denmark or any national thereof had an interest at any time on or
See Borchard, "Reprisals on Private Property," 30 AM. J. INT. L. 108 (1936);
GATHINGS, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND AMERICAN TREATMENT oF ALIEN ENEMY
PROPERTY (1940) especially introduction by Borchard; J. B. MooRE, INTERNATIONAL
LAw AND SoME CuRRENT ILLUSIONS (1924).
6
55 CoNc. REc. 4850, 4857, 4859, 4863 (1917). See also statement of
Charles Warren, then Assistant Attorney-General, in HEARINGS BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE OF SENATE CoMMITTEE ON COMMERCE ON H. R. 4960, 65th Cong., 1st
sess., pp. 130, 131 (1917); Warren, Book Review, 12 AM. J. INT. L. 676 at 678
(1918); and a recent case, Pflueger v. United States, (App. D. C. 1941) 121 F (2d)
732.
7
48 Stat. L. I (1933). The act made some other changes: (a) The omission of
all restrictions on authorization to regulate transfers of credit "relating solely to
transactions to be executed wholly within the United States"; (b) the omission of the
phrase authorizing the regulation of transfers of ownership of property; (c) the omission of the phrase "whether enemy [or] ally of enemy"; · ( d) the omission of the
phrase specially referring to the President's authority to investigate and regulate transactions in bonds and certificates for the purpose of strengthening the market for these
instruments.
8
5 FED. REc. 1400. The effective date of the Executive Order was April 8,
1940.
5
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since April 8, 1940. In view of the concern expressed as to whether the
order and section 5(b) were applicable to securities,0 section 5 (b) of the
T.E.A. was again amended on May 7, 1940 by a joint resolution of
Congress. Provisions for the- regulation of the transfer, withdrawal or
exportation of, or dealing in "any evidences of ... ownership of property in which any foreign state or a national or political subdivision
thereof, as defined by the President, has any interest" were inserted.10
This public resolution also ratified Executive Order 8389 of April rn,
I 940 and the regulations and general rulings issued thereunder by the
Secretary of the Treasury.
The amended provisions of section 5 (b) authorized the President
to define the countries whose assets should be frozen. No criterion for
this determination was provided in the amended section. However, in
practice, originally these were countries which were victims of aggression-Denmark, Norway. As other countries were invaded or dominated by the Axis-the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and the
Balkan states10a-freezing was successively extended, during 1940 and
the first half of 1941, to their assets by executive orders fixing effective dates which corresponded approximately to the dates of invasion
or domination.11 In June 1941, by Executive Order 8785, dated June
14, 1941, control was extended to the aggressors themselves, Germany
and Italy, and, with the exception of Turkey, to the rest of continental
Europe, including such previous victims of German aggression as Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, and the four European neutralsPortugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and Spain.12 The U.S.S.R. was also de. 9 On this point the Senate Report (S. REP. 1496, 76th Cong., 3rd sess., p. I
(1940)] states: ":rhe purpose of the resolution is to remove any doubt that section
5(b) of the act of October 6, 1917, as amended, authorizes the President to regulate
transactions in evidences of indebtedness and evidences of ownership of property in
which foreigners have an interest, and to require reports concerning all foreign-owned
property." Senator Wagner, Chairman of the Senate's Banking Committee, in introducing the Joint Resolution-to the Senate stressed that Congress, in amending§ 5(6) in
1933, did not intend to recover in any way the power of the President to deal with
these matters but rather to extend those powers, and therefore the omission of the
words "evidences of indebtedness" was due to inadvertence. See 86 CoNG. REc. 5006
(1940).
v
10
54 Stat. L. 179 (1940).
10a Freezing was extended to the Baltic states after Soviet entry into the war.
11 For the effective dates fixed by Freezing Orders, see § 3 of Executive Order
\
8785 as amended, 6 FED. REG. 2897 (June 14, 1941).
'
12 6 FED. REG. 2897 (1941). Subsequently, general licenses were issued to these
neutral countries: Sweden, No. 49, June 20, 1941; Switzerland, No. 50, June 20,
1941; Spain, No. 52, July II, 1941; Portugal, No. 70, August 11, 1941. 6 FED.
REG. 3057, 3404, 4046.
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dared a blocked country at this time.18 On July 26, r94r, when Japan
overran Indo-China, control was invoked against her. At the same time
freezing was extended to another victim of aggression and friendly
government, China, at the specific request of Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-Shek.14 On December 9, r 941 freezing was extended to Thailand,
and to Hong Kong on December 26, r94r. Finally the Executive
Order 8998 15 provided for the automatic extension of freezing control
to such new countries as may be controlled or occupied by any of the
existing blocked countries.
Originally the purposes of foreign funds control were:
r. To protect the property of victims of aggression.
To prevent increase of the financial resources of the Axis
states.
3. To protect American banks and business institutions from
double liability.
4. To protect the American security market.
S. To protect American creditors.
2.

As the international crisis deepened, and as the scope of the foreign
funds control was widened to include more and more countries, the
efficacy of the control as an implement of foreign policy and weapon of
economic warfare became more and more apparent. Furthermore, this
control became an important aid in pursuance of the United States
policy of Western Hemisphere solidarity and security. With the entry
of the United States into the present war, the use of control for the purpose of implementing the war effort became dominant.16
The latest legislative step in the evolution of T.E.A. followed our
entry into the present war. It was taken by Congress on December 18,
13 Immediately following the German attack on Russia, a general license was
granted to the U.S.S.R., No. 51, June 24, 1941. 6 FED. REG. 3100.
14
6 FED. REG. 3715. See Treasury Press Release No. 7, July 26, 1941.
15
December 26, 1941, 6 FED. REG. 6785. Executive Orel.er 8998 amended
Executive Order 8785-and this provision became subdivision (iii) of§ 5(D).
16
For a more detailed statement of the general purposes of foreign funds control,
see U. S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, FOREIGN FuNDS CONTROL, ADMINISTRATION OF
THE WARTIME FINANCIAL AND PROPERTY CONTROLS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 2 ff., 7 ff. ( l 942); the Brief of the United States of America as Amicus
Curiae, p. 4, Commission for Polish Relief v. Banca National a Rumaniei (National
Bank of Rumania), 288 N.Y. 332, 43 N.E. (2d) 345 (1942) and the statements of
the Appellate Division, 262 App. Div. 543, 30 N.Y.S. (2d) 690 (1941) and of the
New York Court of Appeals in the same case; LOURIE, FREEZING OF FoREIGN ASSETS
IN THE UNITED STATES 44, 73, (1941) (unpublished Master's Essay, Burgess Library,
Columbia University).
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194~ with the adoption of the First War Powers Act 1941,11 Title III
of which c~ntains an amendment to section 5 (b). '
B.

THE AcT AFTER THE ENTRY oF THE UNITED STATES
INTO THE PRESENT WAR

Principal Reasons for the z94z Amendment to Section 5(b)
With the entry of the United States into the present war, it became
necessary to,co-ordinate the system of "freezing control," which had
been operating very satisfactorily for almost two years, with other provisions of the T.E.A. of October 6, 1917 concerning '~enemy property"
and "trading with the enemy." A partial co-ordination was effected by
the issuance by the President on December 13, 1941 of a general license. 18 under section 3 (a) of the T.E.A. permitting any transaction
which the Secretary of ~e Treasury should license under the freezing
control.
The state of war brought about its legal consequences, e.g., the Axis
countries became enemies, the constitutional "war power" could be invoked, and the wartime legislation became effective-and these legal
consequences pointed up the inadequacy of both the system of prewar
foreign funds control and of the T.E.A. to deal with the exigencies of
modern war. Even before our country entered this war, it was evident
that the measures and definitions of the T.E.A. were obsolete instni. ments with which to cope, in economic and psychological warfare, with
such dangerous enemies as the Axis, particularly Germany. Prior to this
war Germany had made exceedingJy extensive preparations-far more
extensive than those made prior to 1917. In the first place she was able
to reduce to a comparatively small amount investments held openly in
her name and by her nationals. In the second place, she succeeded in
.. ·disguising her ownership and control of important commercial and industrial enterprises by,using citizens of the United Stat.es and of neutral
or other countries as her instrumentalities. Germany also used her influence, gained by participation in certain cartel and patent agreeements,
to add to her own strength and to weaken her enemy's war potential.19
Furthermore, .not only w~re German subsidiaries abroad mobilized to
1.

17
55 Stat. L. 838 (1941), 50 U.S.C. (Supp. 1942), Appendix, § 5 et seq.
(hereinafter called "F.W.P.A. 1941").
·
18
6 FED. REG. 6420 (1941).
19 Kronstein, "The Dynamics of German Cartels and Patents," 9 UNiv. CHI. L.
REv. 643 (1942), IO id. 49 (1942); GuENTER REIMANN, PATENTS FOR HITLER
(1942). Cf. GILBERT, EXPORT PRICES AND EXPORT CARTELS (1940) (U.S. Temporary National Economic Committee, Monograph No. 6).
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serve the gigantic war machine, but foreign subsidiaries in Germany
were geared into the German war economy, and were used to influence
the activities of the parent corporations.
Also, the situation as to foreign property at the outbreak of the
present war differed substantially from that at the outbreak of the First
World War. During the last war the Alien Property Custodian at the
peak of his ,il.Ctivity administered property valued at something over
$500,000,000. When the United States entered this war, over $7,000,000,000 worth of property was already subject to existing control.20 This situation created a need for flexibility in legislation on wartime alien property control which the terms of the T.E.A. could not
provide.
Under the prewar freezing control the government could exercise
supervision over transactions in foreign property, either by prohibiting
such transactions or by permitting them on condition and under license;
it could not affirmatively compel the use and application of foreign
property in the best interests of the United States.
Last but not least, doubts were expressed as to the effectiveness of
some of the sections of the T.E.A.21 These were the principal reasons
which brought about the last amendment to section 5 (b).
2.

The Main Changes Brought About by the Amendment

The main changes made by the last amendment to section 5 (b) may
be summarized as follows:
I. The authority conferred upon the President by this section
extends to all foreign property interests, not only to those of countries as defined by the President.22
20 H. REP. 1507 ON H. R. 6233, 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 3 (1941).
21 See id., p. 2. It is interesting to note that Title II of the bill introduced in the
House on December II, 1941 by Mr. Sumners (H.R. 6206) provided: "Section 301.
All of the provisions of the Trading with the Enemy Act, approved October 6, 1917
(40 Stat. 4u), together with all of the amendments to such Act, which have for any
reason ceased to be in effect, are hereby reenacted." A similar bill was introduced in the
Senate as S. 2II8. This original bill, called a "shot-gun" measure [Rep. Michener in
87 CoNG. REc. 9856 (1941)], was not approved but was referred to the Committee
on the Judiciary, which rewrote it and submitted it on December 15, 1941 as H. R.
6233 and S. 2129. See also 87 CoNG. REc. 9862 (1941) (Rep. Gwynne) and id. at
9856 (Rep. Michener).
22 Practically, this change does not amount to an extension of authority, because
there were no standards or requirements of findings set up in the superseded text of this
subsection; however, it makes a big difference from the theoretical and political points
of view. Formerly, the countries were defined by the President in the Executive
Order; now they are determined by the Secretary of the Treasury in consultation with
the Secretary of State. Executive Order 9193, July 7, 1942, 7 FED. REG. 5205, § l 1.
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2. The President is given authority to define all terms employed in the section.28
3. The President is authorized not only to "freeze" foreign
property, or interest in property, but to vest it when, as, and upon
.the terms ·directed by the President, in such agency or person as
may be designated from time to time by the President.
4. The president is authorized, upon such terms and conditions
as he may prescribe, to order that such foreign properfy shall be
held, used, administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with
in the interest and for the benefit of the United States.
5. The President is authorized to subdelegate authority conferred upon him by this subsection to an agency designated by him.
6. The President is authorized to take other and further measures not inconsistent with the provisions of the subdivision for its
enforcement.
7. The authority described in subdivision (A) is extended also
to "securities." The words "evidences of indebtedness or evidences
of ownership of property" are omitted.
8. The President is authorized not only to investigate, regulate or prohibit, as before, but in addition, to direct and compel,
nullify, void, and prevent any acquisition, holding, withholding,
use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in or exercising any right, power, or privilege
with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which
any foreign country or national thereof has any interest by any
person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States.
9. Territorial limitations to the jurisdiction of the United
States ar~ more precisely defined. 24 '
IO. It broadens the President's investigatory and reporting
powers: the President may require any person to keep a full record
and to furnish under oath in the form of reports or otherwise,
complete information relative to any act or transaction referred to
28
,
See§ 5(b) (3). Prior to.its last amendment§ 5(b) had conferred upon the
President a power to define in the following words: "the President may ... investigate,
regulate, or prohibit ... any ... dealing in, any evidences of indebtedness or evidences
of ownership of property, in which any foreign state or a national or political subdivision thereof, as defined by the President, has any interest. . . ."
24
, New text: "by any person, or with respect to any property, subj(,ct to the
jurisdiction of the United States.•.." Old text: "by any person within the United
States or any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof. . . ." The old text was considered as an unnecessary, restrictive limitation as it might have been construed not to
extend to assignments made abroad with respect to frozen assets in the United States.
See Kalnin v. Kleewen, (N.Y. City Ct. Nov. 15, 1941), 106 N. Y. L. J. 1515:3,
which held the freezing order did not affect an assignment made in Latvia.
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in this subdivision before, during or after completion thereof, or
relative to any "foreign property" as defined by the President. In
any case in which a report could be required, the President may not
only require the production of books of account, records, etc., but
also seize them if necessary to national security or defense. It is to
be noted that this power includes the power to require reports of
American property abroad.
The amendment purported to be and is a substantial enlargement
of the president's authority. 25 There can be no doubt that section 5(b)
as amended deals with American and foreign-owned property, and not
merely enemy-owned property. Subdivision (r)(A) confers upon the
President authority which can be briefly described as that for the exercise of "exchange control" in the broader sense of this term.26 This
authority, if it is to be effective, is not and cannot be limited to "foreign
exchange," gold or silver, etc., belonging only to foreigners. Besides,
the fuller power was enjoyed and exercised by the President during·
the last war, in the crisis of r933, and after the amendments of March
9, r933 and May 7, r940; subdivision (r)(A) of section 5(b), as
amended by F.W.P.A. r94r, incorporated the Joint Resolution of May
7, r940 in substantially identical language.27 The limitation of the application of section 5(b), subdivision (r)(A), to foreign funds only
would constitute a serious curtailment, not an enlargement, of the
President's powers.
However, subdivision ( r) (B) of section 5 (b) extends only to
foreign-owned property. Confusion in Congress with respect to this has
been caused by the unfortunate language of the amended section 5 (b).
The conjunctive "and" after subdivision (A), followed in subdivision
(B) by "power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving,
any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any
25
See S. REP.911, 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 2 (1941); H. REP. 1507 on H. R.
6233, 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 3 (1941); 87 CoNG. REc. 9845 (1941), especially
Senator Van Nuys at 9846 ff.
26
For different meanings of the term "exchange control," see LouRrn, FREEZING
OF FoREIGN ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES, c. 5, "Exchange Control and Freezing''
(1941) (thesis); PAUL EINZIG, EXCHANGE CONTROL (1934); M.A. HEILPERIN, INTERNATIONAL MoNETARY EcoNoM1cs 237 (1939); E. B. DIETRICH, WoRLD TRADE
125 (1939); ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, MONEY IN THE LAW 475 (1939); HOWARD s.
ELLIS, ExcHANGE CONTROL IN CENTRAL EuRoPE (1941); L. of N. 1938. II. A. 10
(II. Economic and Financial, Report on Exchange Control).
27
See also the statement made by Rep. Sumners toward the end of the debate on
the F.W.P.A. 1941, which pointed out that under the F.W.P.A. 1941, the Executive
retained all powers theretofore conferred by§ 5(b), as amended, 87 CoNG. REc. 9946
(1941).
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interest" 28 conjoins two phrases which ought to be separate, and is
thus apt to convey a wrong impression at the first reading. 20

3. Executive Action Pursuant to the Amendment
February 12, 1942, the President delegated to the Secretary of the
Treasury all power and authority conferred upon hi~ by sections 3(a)
and 5(b} of the T.E.A. as amended. 30
By the Presidential Order 9095 of March t 1, 1942,31 the Office of
•the Alien Property Custodian 82 in this war was established within the
Office of Emergency Management. The Constitution, the F.W.P.A.
r941, and the T.E.A. of October 6, 1917, as amended were referred
to as a basis for authority.
All power and authority conferred on the President by sections
3(a) and 5(b) of T.E.A. of October 6, 1917, as amended, except such
as were delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury by executive orders
issued prior to February 12, 1942, and to the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System by Executive Order 8 843 of August 9,
1941,88 were delegated to and vested in the Alien Property Custodian.
The delegation of powers and authority under sections 3 (a) and 5 (b)
of T.E.A. to the Secretary of the Treasury on February 12, 1942, was
revoked.
Also on March l l, l 942, pending staffing and organization of the
Office of the A.P.C., the A.P.C. temporarily redelegated to the Secretary of the Treasury these powers and authority. The Treasury
exercised both these powers and the freezing control powers until July
6, 1942.34 As of that date, Executive Order 9193, amending Executive
Order 909 5, provided for a co-ordination and division of powers between the A.P.C. and the Treasury Department. It also provided that
no person affected by any action taken by either the Secretary of the
28

Rep. Hancock, referring to this phrase, remarked: "This limitation applies to
both (A) and (B), as I see it." 87 CoNG. REc. 9861 (1941). See id. at 9862 for
remarks by Reps. Sumners and Gwynne.
29 However, during the debate in the House, the confusion was removed from
the minds of .some representatives (but not from the text of the act). See 87 CoNG.
REc. 9861, 9863 (1941).
30 Treasury Department Release 28, dated February 23, 1942.
31
7 FED. REG. 1971, as amended by Executive Order 9193, 7 FED. REG. 5205,
hereafter referred to as "alien property order."
The Office of A.P.C., established during World War I, ceased on July 1, 1934;
the A.P.C.'s powers and duties were transferred to the Department of Justice and all
money and property held or in trust for him was transferred to the Attorney-General.
82
Hereafter called A.P.C •
33
•
6 FED. REG. 4035.
34
Press Release 31, March 18, 1942.
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Treasury or the A.P.C. should be entitled to challenge the validity
thereof on the ground that the action was within the jurisdiction of
the A.P.C. rather than of the Secretary of the Treasury or vice versa.
Under this order the Secretary of the Treasury has been redelegated
residual authority under sections 3(a) and 5(b) of T.E.A. as amended.
The Secretary of the Treasury also retains the licensing authority over
trade and communications with the enemy.85
The A.P .C. is authorized ( section 2) to take such action as he deems
necessary in the national interest including, but not limited to, the
power to direct, manage, supervise, control or vest with respect to

r. Enemy-owned 86 or controlled business within the United
States and the dollar balances and other assets of such business.
2. All other enemy property including claims of enemy nationals involved in estates, trusts, receivership proceedings, etc.,
except dollar balances, bullion and securities, which the Treasury
will continue to handle unless these are needed by the A.P.C. in
the management of other property taken from the same enemy.
3. Business owned or controlled by a national of any foreign
country where the A.P .C. certifies that it is necessiry in the national interest for him to assume control. (If he does not so certify, these ·businesses, like any other property of persons who are not
nationals of a designated enemy country, remain under the Secretary of the Treasury 87 by virtue of the residual powers granted
him by section 5(b) of T.E.A., as amended.)
4. All foreign owned patents, copyrights, and trade-marks.
5. Foreign ships.
The A.P .C. is authorized to take measures concerning representation of the interest of any person within any designated enemy country
or any enemy-occupied territory in connection with any judicial or administrative proceedings as in his judgment and discretion is or may be
within the intere.st of the United States, and to issue regulations governing the service of process on such persons. ( Section 5.)
The A.P.C. and Secretary of the Treasury are further authorized,
jointly and severally, to prescribe from time to time regulations, rulings; and instructions to carry out the purposes of this executive order.
( Section 4.)
35

See§ 3(a) of T.E.A. and General Ruling No. 11.
"Enemy," in this phrase means "national of a designated enemy country."
87
The Treasury Department uses these powers, for example, for the directive
licensing program under which a large volume of strategic assets held for foreign accounts have been diverted to war uses.
86
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The order subdelegates the powers conferred upon the President
by section 5(b) and authorizes further subdelegation in order to carry
out the functions under the order.
In the exercise of the authority delegated to the A.P.C. he shall be
subject to the provisions of Executive Order 8839 of July 1941 38 establishing the Board of Economic Warfare, and shall designate a representative to that board. ( Section 7.)
The order provides for consultations between the Secretary of the
Treasury or the A.P.C., as the. case may be, and the Secretary of State
before vesting any property or adding any additional foreign countries
to section 3 of Executive Order 83 89 as amendld. ( Section 1 r.) The.
order establishes a presumption of required and appropriate consultations. ( Section 13.)
The order defines, for the purposes· of this executive order, the
terms "designated enemy country" as any foreign country against which
the United States has declared the existence of a state of war and any
other country with which the United States is at war in the future; and
"national" as having the meaning given to it by the freezing order with
certain qualifications.
'
Pursuant to this order the A.P.C. issued, on March 26, 1942,39
regulations establishing procedure for the receipt and disposition of
claims to property vested in the A.P.C. and for the hearing of such
claims by the Vested Property Claims Committee.
On March 25, 1942, the A.P.C. issued his first vesting order, vesting in himself the property of I. G. Farbenindustrie, Standard-I. G.
Co.,40 and at the time of the writing of this paper there have been is:_
sued over five hundred such vesting orders.40 a

C. Extent of Effectiveness of Old Provisions of the Act
Though Title ITI of the F.W.P.A., 1941 was intended also to dispel doubts as to the extent of the effectiveness of some sections of the
T.E.A., it cannot be said to have succeeded in this respect. It does not
expressly repeal any provisions of T.E.A. of 1917, as amended, but the
extent to which it does so by implication will probably be a frequently
arising question. Judicial dislike for implied repeal offers no guide,
though it must be reckoned with. 41
38

6 FED. REG. 3823.
7 FED. REG. 2290.
40
7 FED. R_EG. 2417 (1942).
4
oa At the present time the vesting orders number over two thousand.
41
See 37 CoL. L. REv. 292 (1937).

39
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This question has already troubled the legislature and courts on
several occasions.42 The arguments pro and con may be summarized as
follows:
I. The T.E.A. of October 1917 was enacted as a permanent piece
of legislation, to become effective on the occurrence of the contingency
provided for-a declaration of war.
2. The act was not terminated by the cessation of hostilities, by
the joint resolution declaring the state of war between Germany,
Austria, and the United States at an end, by the President's proclamation of peace,43 or by the public resolution terminating wartime legislation. 44
'
3. The administration evidently proceeded on the theory that the
T .E.A. remained in effect, referring to various provisions of the act in
measures taken after our entry into the war.45
4. The Supreme Court has expressly referred to sections 2(b ), 7,
and 7(b) in its decisions~40 Other courts have made similar references. 47
5. A Report of the Committee on the Judiciary states that some
42 Senator Reed, on March 9, 1933, during debates on the Emergency Banking
Act, stated that no one knew definitely whether it had been repealed by the KnoxPorter Joint Peace Resolution, 77 CoNG. REc. 60 (1933), approved July 2, 1921, by
which Congress declared the war to be at an end. However, the Public Resolution of
March 3, 1921, terminating wartime legislation, expressly exempted the T.E.A. from
its operation. Irrespective of the question of the revival of the T.E.A. with the entry
of this country into war, there are authoritative court pronouncements that it was not
terminated by the cessation of hostilities, by the Knox-Porter Joint Resolution, or by
the President's proclamation of peace. Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51,
43 S. Ct. 486 (1922); Munich Reinsurance Co. v. First Reinsurance Co. of Hartford,
(C.C.A. 2d, 1925), 6 F. (2d) 742, appeal den., 273 U.S. 666, 47 S. Ct. 458 (1927).
43
See cases cited supra, note 42.
44
Pub. Res. 64, 41 STAT. L. 1359 (1921).
45
Presidential License of December 13, 1941, 6 FED. REG. 6420, referred to §
3(a); Executive Order 9095, 7 FED. REG. 1971 (Mar. I 1, 1942), referred, in addition, to F.\V.P.A. 1941, and to T.E.A. of October 6, 1917; Press Release 31 of the
Treasury Department, March 18, 1942, refers to § 3 (a).
United States censorship regulations are issued by the Office of Censorship, 8 FED.
REG. 1644 (1943), under § 3(c) of the T.E.A., among other authority; the regulations issued by the Secretary of State on March 5, 1943, relating to the Transportation
of Enemy Aliens on American Vessels and Aircraft, are issued pursuant to § 3 (b) of
the T.E.A., 8 FED. REG. 2820 (1943). Indicative also is the fact that the A.P.C. now
refers in his vesting orders to the T.E.A. and not merely to § 5(b) as amended, as
he did formerly.
46
Ex parte Colonna, 314 U.S. 510, 62 S. Ct. 373 (1942); Ex parte Kawato, 317
U.S. 69, 63 S. Ct. II5 (1942).
47
See Kaufmann v. Eisenberg, 177 Misc. 939, 32 N.Y.S. (2d) 450 (1942); The
Pietro Campanella, (D. C. Md. 1942) 47 F. Supp. 374; Drewry v. Onassis, 179
Misc. 578, 39 N.Y.S. (2d) 688 (1942); Draeger Shipping Co. v. Crowley, (D.C.N.Y.
1943) 49 F. Supp. 215.
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sections are still in effect 48 and the fact that Congress did not approve
the bill introduced by Mr. Sumners in the House on December II,
1941,49 purporting to re-enact all provisions of the T.E.A. together
with all the amendments, which have ceased to be in effect, might lead
to the inference that Congress has proceeded on the theory stated in
the report: "Some sections of that act are still in effect. Some sections
have terminated, and there is doubt as to the effectiveness of other
sections."
·
6. The amendment does not cover the whole field and should be
treated merely as an adaptation of the law to present conditions, and
other provisions of the T.E.A. should be considered to be superseded
only to the extent that they are inconsistent with the latter amendment,
according to the principle "Lex posterior derogat priori."
7. The effectiveness of certain provisions of the T.E.A. 50 might
assist in upholding section 5(b) as amended by F.W.P.A. r94r against
attack on constitutional grounds.
On the other hand:
r. Title III of the F.W.P.A. r94r is so comprehensive a measure
and contains so many duplications of unrepealed sections of the T.E.A.
that it should be considered as intended not only to modify the T.E.A.
but to be in itself a complete and comprehensive measure for covering
the whole field 51-dealing with "exchange control" and foreign property in time of war and emergency. The apparent duplications are:
(a) Section 5 (b) has a so-called acquittance provision [ subdivision (2)]; the original T.E.A. contained a like provision in
section 7 ( e).
(b) Section r 8 of the T.E.A. is included almost in corpore in
subdivision (3) of section 5 (b).
·
(c) Section 5(a) 'of the T.E.A. provides for subdelegation of
authority conferred upon the President by the act, and the same is
done by section 5 (b) as amended.
( d) The penalty pr0visio11 of the T .E.A., section r 6, is duplicated by section 5 (b).
(e) Section 5(a) of the T.E.A. confers authority upon the
President to make such rules and regulations as may be proper
48

H. REP. 1507, on H. R. 6233, ·77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 2 (1941).
H. R. 6206. A similar bill was introduced in the Senate as S. 2II8.
50
Particularly § 9(a). Cf. Draeger Shipping Co. v. Crowley (D.C.N.Y. 1943)
49 F. Supp. 21_5.
51
,
See supra, note 41.
49
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and necessary to carry out the provisions of the T .E.A. Section
5 (b) makes similar provision for its enforcement.
Congress, by rejecting the bill introduced by Mr. Sumners on
December r rth, which was an administration bill, providing for the reenactment of all provisions of the T.E.A., manifested its intent to substitute a new comprehensive scheme for dealing with foreign-owned
property. The administration bill at the same time indicated that the
administration itself supposed a further Congressional act necessary for
the re-enactment of,the provisions of the T.E.A. with the exception of
section 5 (b) as amended.
3. Congress, by approving and confirming previous measures of
the administration, and by extending the system of foreign property
control, intended to establish a new, integrated and comprehensive
legal basis for that extended treatment of foreign property.52 This
intent might be said to be evidenced by the fact that freezing control
before the amendment and ratification and the new text of section 5 (b)
of the T.E.A. is phrased in terms of "national" and "foreign country"
and not, as the original T.E.A., in terms of "enemy" and "ally of
enemy."
4. The inadequacy of measures and definitions provided for in the
T.E.A. necessitated the adoption of an entirely new scheme which does
not fit well into the old scheme of the original T.E.A., and forcing it
into the old framework might thwart the legislative purpose.
5. To adopt the contrary view, that is, that Title III of the F.W.
P.A. r94r merely amended one section of the T.E.A. and that the
other sections, so far as not amended, are effective, would lend support
to the argument against the validity of many measures of the administration taken pursuant to amended section 5(b), as they are inconsistent
with other sections of the T.E.A. And it is well-settled that the construction placed on a statute by administrative officers who are charged
with its application should be given great, if not controlling, weight in
its interpretation. 53
The relevancy of such arguments for the interpretation and construction of statutes can be supported by a long array of judicial and
2.

52

See 87 CoNG. REc. 9858 ff. (1941), especially p. 9861 for remarks of Rep.
Hancock and p. 9865 for remarks of Rep. Robison.
53
Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 53 S. Ct.
350 (1933); Securities & Exchange Commission v. Associated Gas & Electric Co.,
(C.C.A. 2d, 1938) 99 F. (2d) 795; Skeen v. Lynch, (C.C.A. 10th, 1931) 48 F.
(2d) 1044.
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other learned authority. 5 It is obvious that any court which may have
to deal with the above-discussed problem will construe the amended
section 5(b) in a way best effectuating the public policy intended to be
served by its enactment. The purpose, 'the subject matter, the context,
the legislative history, and the executive interpretation of the statute
are aids to construction which may indicate the legislative intent. 55
4,

II
PROBLEMS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

A. Problems of Constitutional Law
I. Congressional Authority
The T.E.A. as originally enacted, together with later amendments,
has been held constitutional and a valid exercise of the war power. 50
Section S (b) of the T .E.A. as amended iri I 933 57 was also upheld as a
valid exercise by Congress of its broad and comprehensive national
authority over the subjects of revenue, finance, and currency, derived
from the aggregate of the powers granted to Congress. 58 The constitutionality of the- amendment adopted by the Joint Resolution of
May 7, I 940 and the new executive orders issued pursuant thereto
have not been challenged in the courts,58a and the courts have rendered
their decisions touching the freezing regulations in tacit assumption of

54 United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch (6 U.S.) 358 at 386 (1805); United States
v. American Trucking Assn., 310 U.S. 534 at 562, 60 S. Ct. 1059 (1940). Cf. Radin,
"Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARV. L. REv. 863 (1930); Landis, "A note on
'Statutory Interpretation,'" id. 886 (1930); Jones, "The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes," 25 WASH. UNiv. L. Q. 2
(1939); Radin, "A Short Way with Statutes," 56 HARV. L. REv. 388 (1942). .
55
See United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 61 S. Ct. 742 (1940).
56 U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, clause 11; Stoehr v. 'Wallace, 255 U.S. 239, 41 S. Ct.
293 (1921); United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1, 47 S. Ct. l (1926);
Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51, 43 S. Ct. 486 (1922); Central
Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554, 41 S. Ct. 214 (1920); The Pietro Campanella, (D.C. Md. 1942) 47 F. Supp. 374.
57
48 STAT. L. 1, § 2 (1933). See supra at note 7.
58
Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 294 U.S. 240, 55 S. Ct. 407 (1935);
Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317, 55 S. Ct. 428 (1935); Perry v. United States,
294 U.S. 330, 55 S. Ct. 432 (1935); Campbell v. Chase Nat. Bank of New York,
(D.C. N.Y. 1933) 5 F. Supp. 156; Uebersee Finanz-Korporation A.G. v. Rosen
(C.C.A. 2d, 1936) 83 F. (2d) 225, cert den., 298 U.S. 679, 56 S. Ct. 946 (1936);
British-American Tobacco Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, (C.C.A. 2d, 1939) 104 F.
(2d) 652, 105 F. (2d) 935, cert. den., 308 U.S. 600, 60 S. Ct. 131 (1939).
5 sa However, a decision rendered after the completion of this paper, United
States v. Von Clemm, (C.C._A. 2d, 1943) 136 F. (2d) 968, shows that a challenge
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their validity. The doubts raised extrajudicially,5° in so far as they
concern statutory support for the measures taken by the Executive, are
settled by the "ratification clause" of Title III of the F.W.P.A. 1941.
The last amendment to section 5(b) of the T.E.A., however, raises
difficult problems of far-reaching implications. Unfortunately, the
regulatory setup resulting from various attempts to readjust the outmoded T.E.A. to peacetime emergency situations and to conditions of
modern warfare is not faultless.
While the statute authorizes not only the freezing of foreignowned property, but also its seizure, administration, control, use, liquidation, etc., it does not make any provision for immediate or later
compensation for the "taking" of the property. Neither does it distinguish between "enemy" and "non-enemy" foreign property. However, this distinction is made in the subsequent acts of the Executive
pursuant to the amended section.
The first question that arises is whether Title III of the F.W.P.A.
1941 is a valid exercise of Congressional power. The constitutional authority principally relied on here is the so-called "war power." Said the
Supreme Court in a leading case:
"The Trading with the Enemy Act, whether taken as originally enacted ... or as since amended ... is strictly a war measure
and finds its sanction in the constitutional provision ... empowering Congress 'to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal,
and make rules concerning captures on land and water'." 60
However, other constitutional authority has and can be invoked for
support in our case. In the cases following the amendment of 1933, the
powers to "coin money, [and] regulate the value thereof" and to regulate foreign commerce have been resorted to. 01 As the holdings in these
cases were with respect to the validity of section 5 (b) in its form and
application at that time, these cases could serve as authority for our
problem only to the extent the provisions of 5(b) in effect at that time
have been substantially incorporated into F.W.P.A. 1941. And even
to the constitutionality of the Act of May 7, 1940 was made by an attack on Executive
Order 8405 of May IO, 1940. See notes 71 and 75, infra.
59
41 CoL. L. REv. 1039 at 1067 et seq. (1941); THIESING, CoNTROL OF FoREIGN-OwNED PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 5, 23 (1941); Harris and Joseph,
"Present Problem Concerning Foreign Funds Control," 105 N.Y.L.J. 336, 354, 372
(1941).
60
Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239 at 241, 41 S. Ct. 293 (1921).
61
See supra, note 58.
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then one case indicated the limitations of these powers in the "inhibitions of the Fifth Amendment against taking private property for public uses without just compensation." 62
Certainly, it could be maintained that freezing control comes within
the police or regulatory power of the state. The demarcation line between eminent domain where just compensation must be paid and
regulatory power where no compensation is required is a shadowy one.
Many cases may fall within this twilight zone and have to be finally de- ·
termined by considering the whole background. In view of the general
change in attitude toward the so-called "exchange control" 63 ( that it
is a matter of economic exigency), the freezing of foreign assets as a
regulatory scheme akin to it can also be regarded as a measure within
the regulatory power of the state.64 However, the origin, scope and
purpose of freezing and exchange control have to be distinguished. 65
On the other hand, the vesting of •foreign property in the national interest in a "designated agency" would seem to fall within the area of
eminent domain. Thus far the requirements of total war have not
changed the constitutional concept as to the area in which and occasions
on which the taking of American and foreign-owned property ( except
that own~d by enemies) for war purposes would be permissible without ju~t compensation. This conclusion is based on the history of the
62

United States v. Driscoll,'(D.C. Mass. 1935) 9 F. Supp. 454 at 456.
E.g., the government of the United States, considering the increasingly general
nature of exchange control, deemed it to be ground for intervention only in cases of
discrimination against American citizens. See GANTENBEIN, FINANCIAL QUESTIONS IN
UNITED STATES FOREIGN- PoLICY, c. 3 (1939) (especially p. 99); 2 HACKWORTH,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 68 (1941).
64 This, however, does not mean that in conflict of laws situations the courts are
going to enforce foreign exchange control rules. On the contrary, the majority of
states deny extraterritorial effect to such laws and refuse them recognition as against
the public policy of the forum even when the state of the forum has itself analogous
laws. Consult Cohn, "Currency Restrictions and the Conflict of Laws," 52 L. Q. REv.
474 (1936); F. A. MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 259 (1938); NUSSBAUM,
MoNEY IN THE LAW 487 (1939); Nussbaum, "Public Policy and the Political Crisis in
the Conflict of Laws," 49 YALE L. J. 1027 (1940); WEIDEN, FoREIGN ExcHANGE
RESTRICTIONS (1939) (N.Y. Univ. School of Law Contemporary Law Pamphlets
Series I, No. 11); Domke, '~Foreign Exchange Restrictions," 21 J. CoMP. LEG. & INT.
L. (3rd ser.) 54 ( 1939); Domke, "International Aspects of European Expropriation
Measures," 22 PRoc. AM. FoR. L. AssN. 5 (1941); Freutel, "Exchange Control,
Freezing Orders and the Conflict of Laws," 56 HARV. L. REv. 30 (1942).
For a most recent pronouncement of an American court to this effect; see International Investment Co., S. A. v. Swiss Bank Corp., N.Y.L.J. 355:7 (Aug. 15, 1943).
65 LouRrn, FREEZING OF FoREIGN AssETS IN THE UNITED STATES, c. 5 (1941)
{thesis).
63
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Property Requisitioning Act, illustrating that the advocates of an allinclusive requisitioning act with payment (rather than piecemeal legislation) failed even in this lesser task and their e:fforts resulted in a compromise measure.66
It is noteworthy, in this connection, that even the view of the Supreme Court and lower courts, that the power "to make rules concerning capture on land and water" authorizes confiscation of enemy-owned
private property, was sharply criticized by eminent writers after the last
war. 67
There exists a divergence of opinion as to whether Congress did or
did not make use of this power to confiscate after the last war. 68
Our difficulties are complicated by two factors: ( 1) the act exceeds
all previous Congressional acts in its treatment of enemy property in
this country, for its sweeping grant of authority to the President embraces not only enemy property, but all foreign property, and (2) section 5(b) of T.E.A., a.s amended by F.W.P.A. 1941, is not only for
wartime but for any other period of national emergency.
In view of the legislative history of the act, it can hardly be inferred that Congress intended to confiscate property of alien friends. 69
The holding of the Supreme Court, in Russian Volunteer Fleet v.
United States,1° that when the United States expropriates the property
66

See HEARINGS BE;FORE THE HousE MILITARY AFFAIRS CoMMITTEE ON S. 1579
and H. R. 4959, 77th Cong., Ist sess., p. 5 (1941); 87 CoNG. REc. 6791, 68II,
7556, 7527, 7532, 7678 (1941); S. REP. 944, 74th Cong., Ist sess., pt. 2, pp. 3-6,
(1935). As to this question in general, see ToBIN and BIDWELL, MOBILIZING CIVILIAN
AMERICA (1940); Cormack, "The Universal Draft and Constitutional Limitations," 3
So. CAL. L. REV. 361 (1930); West, "The Validity of Forced Loans in Time of War
-A Consideration of S. 1650," 8 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 904 (1940); "American Economic Mobilization," 55 HARV. L. REv. 427 at 506 ff. (1942); Marcus, "The Taking
and Destruction of Property under a Defense and War Program," 27 CoRN. L. Q. 317,
476 at 506 ff. (1942).
67 MooRE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SoME CURRENT ILLUSIONS (1924); Borchard, "Enemy Private Property," 18 AM. J. INT. L. 523 (1924); Borchard, "Treatment of Enemy Private Property in the United States before the World War," 22 id.
636 (1928); Borchard, "Reprisals on Private Property," 30 id. 108 (1936).
68
See Cummings v. Deutsche Bank und Discontogesellschaft, 300 U.S. I 15, 57
S. Ct. 359 (1937). For a survey of the American treatment of enemy property see
GATHINGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AMERICAN TREATMENT OF ALIEN ENEMY
PROPERTY (1940). See further Borchard, Introduction to Gathings' work just cited
and his articles in the American Journal of International Law cited supra, note 67.
69
See Turlington, "Vesting Orders under the First War Powers Act 1941," 36
AM. J. INT. L. 460 (1942). See also Cummings v. Deutsche Bank und Discontogesellschaft, 300 U.S. n5, 37 S. Ct. 359 (1937).
70
282 U.S. 481, 51 S. Ct. 229 (1931).
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of an alien friend, the Fifth Amendment requires that it pay. just compensation equivalent to the full value of the property contemporaneously with the taking, must still be considered good law, though the
case itself might, have been decided differently today. However, section 5(b) provides no standards for differentiation between friendly
and enemy foreign countries and nationals thereof as guidance for the
Executive in the administration of the act. If standards should be held
to be necessary, they could eventually be found in the approval and
confirmation of preceding administrative measures, i.e., in freezing
control,11 where the criterion-Axis and countries invaded or controlled
by Axis-has more or less crystallized. To apply the standards of the
T.E.A. would probably remove this doubt but would eventually frustrate the purpose of the amendment.
A further possible argument could be made that the expression, "in
th~ interest and for the benefit of the United States," used in section
5(b) as amended by F.W.P.A. 1941, does not establish an intelligent
standard for the exercise of authority delegated to the President in
dealing with "any property or interest of any foreign country or national thereof." Such a contention would raise the questions to what
extent the principal authorities 12 that might be cited in its support have
retained their original force and whether they are applicable in our
case. The principal authorities just referred to deal with acts relating to
internal affairs; two with the National Industrial Recovery Act, and the
third with t~e Agricultural Adjustment Act, and have to be judged in
71

As can be deduced from the decision handed down in United States v. Von
Clemm, (C.C.A. 2d, July 14, 1943) 136 F.(2d) 968, the appellants contended that
§ 5(b) of the T.E.A., as it was in effect when the first freezing order No .. 8389 of
April 10, 1940 (5 FED. REG. 1400) was issued, and as it was in effect at the time
of Executive Order No. 8405 of May 10, 1940 (5 FED. REG. 1677) (the order with
which the inst;nt case is concerned) after amendment by the Act of May 7, 1940,
was an improper delegation of authority from Congress to the President and that the
test established in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241 (1933),
and A. L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837
(1935) was not met. The circuit court (L. Hand, Swan and Frank) rejected this contention and upheld the constitutionality of § 5(b) as amended by the Act of May 7,
1940 and the validity of Executive Orders No. 8389 and 8405 because the approval
and confirmation clause [§ (2)] in the Act of May 7, 1940 "removed all question of
improper delegation with regard to Order 8389 and provided an adequate standard
and guide for his [the President's] exercise of discretion in Order No. 8405." 136
F. (2d) at 970.
72
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S. Ct. 241 (1935); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837 (1935);
United States_v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312 (1935).

1943}

TRADING WITH ENEMY

225

the light of surrounding circumstances and the political situation prevailing at that time. The act under discussion relates to national defense and external affairs, 73 and in these spheres the doctrine of the
Curtiss-Wright case,74 to the extent that it dispenses with the rigid requirement of standards, seems to be in point.75
The fact that section 5 (b) provides powers which may be used in
peacetime emergencies lays it open to attack, as it does not then have
the support of the constitutional war power. However, it must be borne
in mind that modern wars do not start in fact with the formal declaration of war, which is frequently omitted, but long before. The powers
conferred by section 5(b) envisage this situation, as they are principally
powers necessary for the successful conduct of economic warfare which
might precede and does parallel actual military hostilities.
Protection of the currency and the furtherance of the monetary
policy require, among other powers, authority for the establishment of
exchange control. This is the substance of subdivision (I) (A) of section 5(b) and finds support in the constitutional powers "to coin money,
[and] regulate the value thereof" and to regulate foreign commerce.
To sustain exchange control the determinations in the Gold Clause and
other cases 76 concerning the validity of section 5 (b) could be invoked.
Moreover, one of the incidents of sovereignty is the exercise of control
over foreign funds in this country to prevent their use for purposes
inimical to the interests of the United States and obnoxious to its public
policy.
It may be further argued that Congress intended to create a broad
73 Subdivision ( 1) (A) of § 5 (b) deals with currency or exchange control questions, and has been upheld previously. See supra, note 58.
74
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 57 S. Ct. 216
(1936).
75
See the circuit court of appeals decision in the Von Clemm case, note 71, supra,
where the court said: "Moreover, there is much persuasive force in the appellee's argument that the power exerted by the Executive with regard to property of foreign nationals in a time of proclaimed emergency falls within the sphere of foreign relations
and is thus free from the limitations imposed on delegated authority." 136 F. (2d) at
970. The court cited Hamilton v. Dillin, 88 U.S. 73 ( I 874); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 57 S. Ct. 758 (1937); United States v. Curtis-Wright Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 57 S. Ct. 216 (1916); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 62 S. Ct.
552 (1942).
, The adoption of the doctrine of the Curtiss-Wright case does not necessarily mean
approval of the historical reasoning of the case. Cf. Goebel, "Constitutional History
and Constitutional Law," 38 CoL. L. REv. 555 (1938).
76
See supra, note 58.
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statutory basis with flexible boundaries 77 which could be expanded by
the executive to their utmost constitutional limits, and that the administration, in the enforcement of the act, has so far remained within
these limits. 78
2. Presidential Authority
Do the President's powers as commander-in-chief of the army and
navy and as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
external relations form a basis for the taking of foreign property? The
alien property order 79 expressly refers to the Constitution, in addition
to the F.W.-P.A. 1941 and the T.E.A. of October 6, 1917, as authority
for the order, stating,further that the President is also acting in his
capacity as President of the United States. It is noteworthy that a similar order by President Wilson; issued during the last war,8° and President Roosevelt's orders relating to freezing control 81 did not expressly
mention the Constitution as a source of authority. This may indicate
that the draftsmen of the alien property order were a~are of questions
of constitutional law which might arise in the present connection. But
the President's powers can add not~ing to the authority of Congress
in delegating powers to the President. On the other hand, the President's constitutional powers may, in some cases, give additional support
or even sole support for certain treatment of foreign property.
The suggestion has been made 82 that it is likely that there is some
area beyond express Congressional delegation in which the Executive
possesses the power to take property. But that there are no limits on
this power is untenable, unless the "practical construction" theory, that
the "construction of the scope of executive power by holders of the
presidential office is entitled to gre?,t weight in determining the effect

I.

77
S. REP. 911, 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 2 (1940): "It gives the President flexible
powers •.• to deal comprehensively with the many problems that surround alien property or iss ownership or control in the manner most effective in each particular case."
78
However, certai!l provisions of Executive Order 9095 of March II, 1942 (7
FED. REG. 1971), and of other regulations, orders, etc., issued by the administration
may cast doubt on this statement. E.g., Executive Order 9193, § 2(b), 7 FED. REG,
5205 (July 6, 1942).
.
79 Executive Order 9095, March II, 1942, as amended by Executive Order 9193,
July 6, 1942.
80 Executive Order Vesting Power and Authority in Designated Officers and
making Rules and Regulations under Trading with. the Enemy Act and Title VII of
the Act approved June 15, 1917 (October 12, 1917).
81 Executive Order 8389 of April 10, 1940, as amended.
82
55 HARV. L. REV. 427 (1942).
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of the Constitution" 83 is carried to its logical extreme. So far, in almost
every instance, the President has used only that power to take property
which the Congress has delegated to him.84
Whatever theory of the origin, scope and nature of the power over
external affairs of the national government and of the President and
Congress we adopt, we cannot deny the comprehensiveness of the President's power. One recent case 85 went so far as to extend extraterritorial
effect to a confiscatory decree of a foreign government affecting property having a situs in the United States. This amounts to the same thing
practically as confiscation of foreign property in the United States by a
President's executive agreement.86 This decision has been held, from
the point of view of our constitutional law, one of the most far-reaching
inroads upon the protection which it was supposed the Fifth Amendment accorded to private property. 87 But it can hardly be conceived how
the President's powers in external affairs can serve as authority for the
taking, without just compensation, of foreign property by an executive
order.88 The Supreme Court, as recently as 1935, said that "the Fifth
Amendment commands that, however great the Nation's need, private
property shall not be thus taken even for a wholly public use without
just compensation." 89 And in a recent research on the applicability of
the Fifth Amendment to treaties, the author concludes:
" ... Treaty stipulations and those of the treaty implementing
instruments must be, or be construed to be, consistent with the due
process and just compensation clauses of the Fifth Amendment of
the Constitution or be held inoperative as domestic law." 90
Though United States v. Pink51 casts some doubt on this conclusion, nevertheless unilateral acts of the sole or chief organ of foreign
83

See Culp, "Executive Power in Emergencies;' 31 M1cH. L. REv. 1066 at 1081

(1933).
84

CoRWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND PowERS 158-163, 189-193 (1940).
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 62 S. Ct. 552 (1942).
86
See Borchard, "Extraterritorial Confiscations;? 36 AM. J. INT. L. 275 (1942);
and cf. Jessup, "The Litvinov Assignment and the Pink Case," 36 id. 282 (1942).
87
Jessup editorial cited supra. Cf. CowLES, TREATIES AND CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw:
PROPERTY INTERFERENCES AND DuE PROCESS oF LAW (1941), especially pp. 288-289.
88
41 CoL. L. REv. 1039 (1941), especially pp. 1064, 1065.
89
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 at 602, 55 S. Ct.
85

854 (1935).
9

°

CowLEs, TREATIES AND CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw: PROPERTY INTERFERENCES
AND DuE PROCESS OF LAw 302 (1941). Cf. McCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENTS 291 ff. (1941).
91
See supra at note 85.
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relations cannot escape the inhibitive force ( admittedly "relaxed" in
wartime) of this constitutional guaranty.
·

B. Problems of Administrative Law 92
The administration of the T.E.A., especially owing to its latest
developments, is a difficult task which will require great skill, expertness and tact from the officers entrusted with it. Many problems of an
intricate nature are lurking in every stage of the enforcement of the
act: in the determination of the character of the property ("enemy,"
"national," etc.), seizure, management and administration, and disposition of the foreign-owned property. The difficulties, however, do
not stem from insufficiency of the statutory authority but rather from
the abundance of power conferred upon the executive branch of the
· government by the F.W:P.A. 194r. The awareness of these officers of
complications which may arise in connection with the discharge of their
duties with respect to foreign-owned property is pianifested by the
guarded terms of the vesting orders 03 and regulations establishing- the
procedure for disposition of claims to property vested in the Alien
Property Custodian or in the Secretary of the Treasury.
Furthermore, in the press release issued by the Secretary of the
Treasury bearing the same date as his first vesting order, we find a term
which indicates that the "vesting" of the property in the Secretary or
in the A.P.C. is considered to be a sequestration not a confiscation:"· ..
the question of the ultimate disposition of the property sequestered is
being left open." 04
.
One of the difficulties in the application of section 5 (b), as amended
by F.W.P.A. 1941, is the proposition that where Congress has not repealed, expressly or bY, implication, a legislative act, in whole or in part,
an administrative agency cannot do so in its enforcement of an amendment to that act. Our problem arises mainly from the apparent inconsistencies which exist betweep. some definitions and provisions of the
executive orders, regulations, etc., issued pursuant to the amendment
and definitions and other provisions of the T.E.A. One example will be
discussed.
The T.E.A. defines and uses "enemy" and "ally of enemy" (section 2). The executive order creating the office of A.P.C. and the
92 Only certai~ aspect_s of the multitude of problems of administrative law will be
here indicated.
93 See 7 FED. REG. 2417 (Mar. 31, 1942), and 8 id. 2126 (Feb. 17, 1943).
94 Treasury Press Release, Feb. 16, 1942 (italics supplied).
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A.P .C.'s vesting orders define and use the term "national of a designated enemy country"; General Ruling I I, issued by the Treasury Department,95 defines and uses the term "enemy national"; and "designated national" is used by the A.P.C. in certain of his so-called general
orders. The last three terms revolve about the pivotal term "national"
used in the freezing order. The terms of the T.E.A. are not identical,
as to definitions given and their content, with those of the executive
order, general ruling, etc. The question, therefore, naturally arises
whether administrative officers entrusted with the enforcement of the
act have, in the exercise of their delegated power, varied basic terms of
the T.E.A., and, if they have, to what extent the definitions of
"enemy" and "ally of enemy" of the T.E.A. have been changed by the
new definitions.
The T.E.A., section 9(a), provides for relief and remedy to "Any
person not an enemy or ally of enemy claiming any interest, right or
title in any money or other property" which may have been transferred
to or seized by the A.P.C. Section 7(c) of the T.E.A. designates this
"relief and remedy" as the "sole" one.96 It consists of a notice of the
claimant's claim under oath and in such form and containing such
particulars as the custodian shall require; the claimant may further
make an application to the President for an order of payment or
transfer of the property. If the President ( or the Attorney General,
who is empowered thereto) shall not so order within sixty days after
the filing of such application or if the claimant shall have filed the
notice as above required and shall have made no application to the
President, suit in equity may be brought by the claimant without waiting on the action of the President ( or Attorney General) and if 'so,
the res is held intact to abide the adjudication of the court.
The Secretary of the Treasury ( on February I 6, I 942) and the
Alien Property Custodian (on March 26, 1942) issued similar regulations for the receipt and disposition of claims to property vested in the
Secretary or the A.P.C. The regulations provide that the claims shall
be filed with the A.P .C. or the Secretary of the Treasury on a special
form; 97 and establish a Vested Property Claims Committee for hearing
95

March 18, 1942, as amended by Public Circular 19, Sept. 22, 1942, and on
Nov. 8, l 942.
96
Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554, 41 S. Ct. 214 (1920);
Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239, 41 S. Ct. 293 (1922); United States Trust Co. v.
Miller, 262 U.S. 58, 43 S. Ct. 489 (1923).
97
A.P.C.-1, 7 FED. REG. 2290; TFVP-1, id. 1021.
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these claims. The committee is to transmit the record, including findings and recommendations, to the A.P.C. ( or the Secretary of the
Treasury) who will issue a decision after an examination of the record
and will give appropriate notice of it.
The question probably will arise whether these regulations substitute, supplement or amend the "sole relief and remedy" provided
for in section 9(a).98 The new forms for the filing of claims do not
refer to section 9 of the T.E.A. as did the old forms prescribed during
the last war. The use of the new forms is expressly limited to persons
( r) who 'assert a claim arising as a result of a specific vesting order,
and ( 2) who are permitted to file a notice of claim pursuant t,o the
provisions of such vesting order or pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Office of the A.P.C. The regulations of the A.P.C. do
not provide who is permitted to file a notice of claim, but under the
vesting orders it can be done by any person except a "national of a
designated enemy country." As an American citizen or friendly alien,
acting for the benefit or on behalf of or as a cloak for "a designated
enemy country," may himself be included in this category, does this
limitation then mean that he can resort neither to the procedure prescribed by A.P.C. nor to section 9(a) of the T.E.A.? It does not, for
that would deprive a citizen or a friendly alien of a right to establish
in a judicial or administrative proceeding that he is not a "national of a
designated enemy country," and furthermore would raise serious
doubts as to the constitutionality of the provisions of section 5 (b) of
T.E.A., as amended, and as t·o the validity of the acts of the executive
branch pursuant thereto. 99 Assuming section 9 (a) to be effective
mutatis mutandis, does the filing of notice of claim have the same effect
as it had under this section prior to F.W.P.A. r94r? That is, can the
claimant go ahead without awaiting the decision of A.P.C. and bring
his suit in equity? Whatever the answer to this question may be,1O0
98 In a, case decided after the completion of this article, Draeger Shipping Co. v.
Crowley, (D.C. N.Y. 1943) 49 F. Supp. :u5, one of the issues involved was whether
§ 9(a) of the T.E.A., as amended, applies to action taken under§ 5(b) of the T.E.A.,
as amended by the F.W.P.A. 1941. This was resolved by Judge Bondy, in the
affirmative.
99 Draeger Shipping Co. v. Crowley, supra. The A.P.C. construes these regulations and his vesting orders as authorizing any person whose property has been vested
to estabiish that he should not be treated as a "national" of a designated "enemy
country." This construction is pointed out in the brief of the government in this case
(p. 49).
,
100
An answer in the affirmative may be inferred from Judge Bondy's decision in
Draeger Shipping Co. v. Crowley, supra.
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that result seems not to have been intended by the regulations of the
A.P .C., which, in· establishing a specific procedure to be followed for
filing and disposing of claims, seem to disregard the provisions of
section 9(a).
Under the original T.EA. the determination, after investigation
by the A.P .C., as to enemy-owned property, was conclusive and final·
for purposes of his immediate possession or right to possession, and
the courts were without jurisdiction to hear and determine issues of
fact or law in any suit at law or in equity as to the enemy status of
a person or of property, except as provided in section 9 of T.E.A. But
the custodian's determination was not conclusive against a claimant's
rights asserted under that section.101 The executive order establishing
the Office of the A.P.C. provides that for the purpose of this order
any determination by the A.P.C. that any property or interest of any
foreign country or national thereof is the property or interest of a
designated enemy country or national thereof shall be final and conclusive as to the power of the A.P.C. to exercise any of the powers or
authority conferred upon the President by section 5 (b) of the T .E.A.,
as amended.102 The foregoing apparently manifests a presidential purpose to limit judicial review to such extent as would be proper in view
of his powers under section 5 (b) and the constitutional requirements.
If section 9 (a) has not been superseded, and since,' according to the
T.E.A., it provides the "sole relief and remedy," suits pursuant to it
must be strictly within its terms, for these are suits against the United
States and the rule is well-established that the suitor's cause must
come within the government's consent.108 Furthermore, the fact should
not be overlooked that the T.E.A. was held to be constitutional, because the remedy under the provisions of section 9 was considered
adequate; 104 and conversely, it was held that "If persons not alien
enemies, or allies of alien enemies, were given no means to protect
their interests in such property the seizure would be unconstitutional
101 Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554, 41 S. Ct. 214 (1920);
Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239, 41 S. Ct. 293 (1921): Simon v. American Exchange
Nat. Bank, 260 U.S. 706, 43 S. Ct. 165 (1922).
102
Sec. IO(a) of Executive Order 9095, as amended by E. 0. 9193, 7 FED. REG.
5205 (July 6, 1942).
108
Banca Mexicano de Comercio e Industria v. Deutsche Bank, 53 App; D.C.
266, 289 F. 924, affd. 263 U.S. 591, 44 S. Ct. 209 (1924).
104
Stoehr v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 539, 41 S. Ct. 293 (1921); Garvan v. Commercial Trust Co. (D.C. N.J. 1921) 275 F. 841, affd. 262 U.S. 51, 43 S. Ct. 486
(1921).
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as without due process of law; but they are given such remedies under
section 9" of the act. 10~ The answer to the question whether the re-,
medy as provided under present regulations will be considered adequate might be determined by the change of attitude_ and the new
doctrinal trend with respect to administrative procedure ( findings and
determination) .106
Assuming the e:ffectiveness of section 9 (a), it is submitted that one
possible solution would be to require the claimant to exhaust the
administrative remedies first, and only then would the courts have
jurisdiction.107 The scope of the judicial review would then have to
be determined. Whether the determination of the "enemy" or "national" character would be considered a "jurisdictional fact" is an
obsc~re question.108 It seems that such a solution might, in case of
attack on this point, uphold the validity of the act as amended and
best serve its purposes.
·
CONCLUSIONS

Our discussion of the evolution of the T.E.A. and of some problems of constitutional and administrative law arising in connection
therewith, permit the following observations and conclusions to be
made:
1. The T.E.A., a war measure adopted during the First World
War, has been resorted to as the statutory basis for various measures
in time of national economic emergency_ (1933) in peacetime. The
broad powers conferred upon the chief executive after the amendment
of 1933 were again used in April 1940 for the creation
of a new
1
implement of foreign policy and a new weapon of econo mic defense
105

Garvan v. $20,000 Bonds, (C.C.A. 2d, 1920) 265 F. 477 at 479.
Cf. Perkins v. Endicott johnson Corp., (C.C.A. 2d, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 208
at 223. However, the decision in the Draeger case (supra, note 98) might lead to the
inference that even though the right to judici~ review of the A.P.C.'s determination
after the filing of the claim might be implied in the regulations, nevertheless the procedure. set up by the A.P.C. could be considered inadequate unless full recourse to the
remedies of §' 9(a) is available to the claimant.
107
See 35 CoL. L. REv. 230 (1935), and Berger, "Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies," 48 YALE L. J. 981 (1939). This viewpoint was expressed as an alternative
in the Government's Brief in the Draeger case (p. 42) before the District Court, the
main contention of the government being that an action does not lie under, § 9(a) to
review or restrain actions taken by the A.P.C. under § 5(b) of the T.E.A., as amended
by F.W.P.A. 1941.
108
Perkins v. Endicott Johnson Corp., (C.C.A. 2d, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 208 at
224.
106
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in an economic and psychological war already going on without military hostilities. The extension of freezing control to Axis powers on
June 14, 1941 marks the transition of this weapon of economic defense
to one of offense. Finally, recourse to the war measure to its fullest
extent has again been had in a new war, the Second World-War.
2. The profoundly changed character of the new war and the
different methods of warfare imperatively demanded a change of
weapons and methods not only on the battlefields but also in the fields
of economic and psychological warfare. The T.E.A. of 1917 bore the
brunt of these changes as reflected in the amendments to it. The
amendment made by the F.W.P.A. 1941 represents an attempt to
adapt an old and obsolete statute to entirely different conditions. And
as the amendment to one section of the act and the measures taken
pursuant thereto do not fit into the old pattern, this "adaptation" is
only liable to create problems which might have been avoided, and at
the same time impede the successful application of the act. In time of
war the burden of agencies entrusted with the enforcement of vital
measures should not be increased by an unfortunate and easily correctible statutory scheme. The adoption of an entirely new T.E.A.
would be much more desirable and expedient. The clarity of the
statutory scheme would not impair the necessary flexibility of the
measures. Unless the necessary "streamlining'' is done by the legislature, it will be done by the courts and must be done at least as much
as possible by the agencies in the process of the enforcement of the act.
This is not to say that the courts will strike down the act itself, but in
sustaining it, they may be forced to interpretations which might adversely affect its efficacy.
•
3. In order to meet the exigencies of a total war the executive
branch of the government has to be equipped with broad powers. The
F.W.P.A. 1941 provides the administration with powers enabling it
to meet an insidious enemy with adequate weapons. The variety of
unscrupulous means used by the Axis in the prosecution of the war
demands flexible devices to combat them. The Axis has miscalculated
on the "weakness" ~f the great democracies in adjusting themselves
to the unlawful measures employed by the Axis in its bid for world
domination. The Axis did not expect that its unlawful methods,
frequently. covered with a thin veil of legality, would be met and
defeated with the perfectly lawful methods of the democracies.
4. The saying that law, and particularly statutory law, lags behind
real life does not find support in our case. Section 5(b) of the T .E.A.
as amended by the F.W.P.A. 1941 looks far ahead, foreshadowing
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and forestalling events to meet not only wartime e}dgencies but national peacetime emergencies as well.
5. The act is a valuable example in the study of the sociology of
law. Its evolution reflects perfectly events which have taken place
since its enactment. The last amendment manifests a dwindling respect
for private property, particularly foreign-owned private property.
Though it is perfectly clear that Congress did not intend to pass an
act for the confiscation of foreign-owned property, yet it did pass an
act enabling the taking of foreign-owned, "non-enemy" property without making prqvision for compensation.. The usual cautiousness in
passing such a far-reaching measure affecting private property was not
present. An investing nation and the guardian of private property
rights in the world found itself, because of the steady undermining of
this legal institution by other nations, in a situation where recourse
to ultima ratio-appeared to be necessary. Whether the form it took
was really necessary and expedient and politically wise, only the future
. will show. The enlightened character of the administration is an assurance of the prudent use o_f ·this extraordinary measure.

